Premature Election Fever and Security Challenges in Nigeria

This piece below was written for Democracy in Africa. Find the original HERE.

‘…These actions amount to a declaration of war and a deliberate attempt to undermine the authority of the Nigerian state… As a responsible government, we will not tolerate this’, declared Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan. This was during his recent imposition of a State of Emergency to mark the onset of army raids in parts of Nigeria’s North-East, the strong hold of the Jama’atul Ahlus Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad, commonly known as Boko Haram, which has waged a deadly insurgency war against the Nigerian state since 2009.

While Boko Haram is apparently the biggest security headache for Africa’s most populous country, it certainly isn’t its only security challenge. Pockets of violence in the oil-rich Niger-Delta, the rise of other militias in the South-West and the Middle-Belt, alarming incidents of kidnapping in the South-East, frequent eruptions of communal violence in Jos, and other forms of violent crime abound. Crucially, the increase in militant activity should be situated within the larger context of Nigeria’s political economy and the 2015 general elections, on which most of the political elite and their networks are now fixated.

Since the transition to democracy in 1999, Nigeria has experienced a period of sustained economic growth averaging 7.4%, driven partly by the rise in global oil prices. Lucrative oil revenues, accounting for 80% of government revenues, have heightened intensely competitive contestations for political office, to do-or-die proportions. Politicians frequently ratchet up identity-based rhetoric along North-South, Christian-Muslim, and other fault lines in the run up to elections. Predictably, with such fierce competition for public offices, election season is punctuated with violence. Events in the Western Region in 1964 and in parts of the North in 2011 serve as particularly notorious examples of the devastation such violence can cause.

Given the enormous (oil) revenues accruing to the government, political posturing towards 2015 elections seems to have started much earlier than usual. Presently, political discourse in Nigeria is feverishly centred on the potential candidates for president and the state governors. Heated political commentaries focus on what region’s “turn” it is to produce the president. The threats and counter-threats being made by various groups are indicative of the acrimony that followed the collapse in 2011 of the ruling People’s Democratic Party’s (PDP) 12-year power-sharing formula between the North and the South. Steps towards a coalition by the main opposition parties, the All Progressives Congress (APC), add fuel to an already raging debate. Nigeria’s growing number of militant groups can only be understood within this context of fierce rhetoric and political re-alignments.

One thread that runs through the militias – Boko Haram, Niger-Delta militants, the Odudua People’s Congress (OPC) and others – is that despite their varied approaches, they provide platforms for those disillusioned with Nigeria’s narrow political system to express their grievances, albeit violently. For example, people in the Niger-Delta have long demanded that underdevelopment in the region be addressed by the government. However, it was only after young men from the area engaged in a sustained insurgency, which crippled oil production, that a government-backed Amnesty Programme was initiated in 2009 to address some of their grievances.

A similar pattern is observable with Boko Haram, where radicalised young men up North have now attained local and international infamy. Their goal is not just to secure the release of detained members but also to reach the unfeasible goal of usurping Nigeria’s secular constitution with Islamic law. Alongside ongoing military action, the government is also considering an amnesty proposal for Boko Haram.

Consequently, these groups cannot just be understood in terms of the security risk they pose or the criminal elements they harbour. They must also be read in political terms, and seen as platforms for the assertion of authority by sections of Nigerians. The country has an exclusionary political system dominated by ‘big men’ or ’godfathers’, and their associates and networks. Barring familial link or other ‘connections’ to these networks, direct participation in Nigeria’s political system depends on luck, or as these groups have discovered, by causing enough mayhem to get the attention of those who matter.

Without such violent mobilisation, members of these militia groups would, politically, be in the same boat as any of the 61% of Nigerians living below the poverty line, or the rest of the rising middle class, who are yet to constitute a critical mass that can effectively demand representation or accountability in decision-making. The power, ‘fame’ and lucrative payoffs that insurgents have gained by carrying arms against the state undermines the sustainability of state interventions and begs the question: what can they realistically offer these groups, and those that will follow them, to pacify their actions in the long term?

Returning to the run-up to Nigeria’s elections in 2015, there are several ways in which militia groups might exercise their new-found power. Some may rally around a particular candidate, allowing them to benefit from the mix of legitimacy and fear that such groups bring. In Nigeria, where there is a long trend of political thugs being recruited by desperate politicians, this would not be an unexpected development. Conversely, Boko Haram, in particular, may try and prevent elections in the North East happening at all. Finally, should these groups be co-opted or crushed, we may see the rise of counter-militias to fill the vacuum that they leave. The massive funds allocated to national security at just under N1 trillion ($4.5 billion) may well give the government the firepower it needs to temporarily destroy or buy-off these groups, but such large funding flows could, just as easily, create sectors of the government who have a vested interest in maintaining an atmosphere of insecurity.

Whatever course these government and militia groups take, the results of the election in 2015 will undoubtedly have immense implications for political stability and security in the country. Boko Haram, for example, is understood by many Southerners in Nigera in terms of the country’s North-South divide. Currently, the group is split into three factions. The main group’s ‘war’ against the Nigerian state started in 2009, before Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner from the Niger-Delta, became President. However, the narrative that has gained currency in the South, is that Boko Haram is a tool used by disgruntled northern politicians, in the fall-out of the PDP’s power-sharing agreement, to destabilise Jonathan’s government. In the unlikely event that the APC fields a northern-Muslim candidate who defeats Jonathan at the polls, the knock-on effects for Boko Haram will be huge.

Regardless of whether Jonathan is unseated, 2015 will also be an important moment for the oil-rich Niger-Delta. Ex-militants have been pacified by an expensive amnesty programme which coincidentally expires in 2015. They have also benefitted immensely from government pay-outs and lucrative security contracts, in one instance worth $103 million. Whether these conciliatory measures continue will depend on who the incoming President needed to appease to secure their electoral victory.

As tremendous political and financial resources continue to pour into Nigeria’s security challenges and its upcoming elections, it is unclear who the winners will be. However, it is unlikely that they will include most ordinary Nigerians in the sun-scorched arid areas of the North-East or those in the oily creeks of the Niger-Delta.

“What’s Next for Security in the Niger-Delta?” ~ A Report by USIP

Militants in the Niger-Delta surrender arms in exchange for the government’s amnesty programme. Photo courtesy: Channels TV

When Nigeria is mentioned, one of the first things that comes to mind is the notorious oil sector. Once the Nigerian oil sector is mentioned, the oil-producing- and until recently, restive Niger-Delta region comes to mind. Once the Niger-Delta region is mentioned, the Nigerian federal government’s Amnesty Programme initiated in 2009 to quench the fire of restiveness and militancy in the region comes to mind. To this effect, a report assessing this amnesty programme was recently published by the  United States Institute of Peace (USIP). It also assesses possible future conflict triggers and trends for the Niger-Delta. The report “finds that there is limited consensus on the prospect and scope of future violence in Nigeria, particularly with regard to the upcoming 2015 presidential elections.” Read the full report on the USIP website (PDF).

Here is a summary of the main points:

  • The Niger Delta has now enjoyed four years of relative calm. However, there is a significant chance the region could see renewed violent conflict in the next one to two years.
  • Dividends from a 2009 amnesty for local militants are real and substantial. They include dramatically improved oil production and revenues, fewer deaths and kidnappings, more relaxed travel restrictions, better elections, and job placement for some ex-fighters.
  • Critics of the amnesty claim the program fails to treat the root causes of conflict, is corrupt and unsustainable, and promotes warlordism and the spread of organized crime, among other things.These criticisms are not without basis, but they often lack context and balance.
  • Major conflict drivers in the delta are still in place, and no long-term peace plan exists. The coming period likely will bring strong flash points and triggers, particularly around the 2015 presidential and gubernatorial elections.
  • Wavering leadership on security, the closedown of the amnesty program in 2015, decreased support for President Goodluck Jonathan’s candidacy, and close electoral results could all lead to violence in the delta.
  •  It is possible nonetheless that the election season will pass without a major, prolonged return to violence in the Niger Delta. Nigeria’s fractured opposition parties may fail to produce a consensus candidate, and the delta is likely to vote overwhelmingly for President Jonathan.
  • The role played by distributions of oil wealth is a particular wild card. It is also still very much unclear how far conflict around the 2015 elections will reflect deeper sociopolitical divisions in Nigeria, or how deep such divisions run.
  • This report finds only limited consensus on how any future violence will look. A majority of sources agreed only on a few likely trends—for instance, an increase in kidnappings and the spread of armed attacks outside the Niger Delta.

Its a very interesting  and enlightening report. Four additional points to note include:

  1. The report states a caveat: “There has been no rigorous assessment of the amnesty program’s successes and failures to date, and this report passes no final judgment.”
  2. It states that “the amnesty program’s most ambitious goal—job placement for participants—has had demonstrable, if somewhat limited, success. Thus far, the Amnesty Office says it has placed roughly 40 percent of its thirty thousand charges into education and skills training programs. More than five thousand ex-fighters traveled abroad to the United States, United Arab Emirates, South Korea, South Africa, and Ghana, among other places, and more are being processed for deployment… The program does seem to be outperforming older, more moribund government job-training programs…. Amnesty Office officials said in late 2012 that perhaps one hundred to two hundred ex-combatants have found long-term work in maritime services, fabrication, and related fields.” (p.3).
  3. Though the report states that “…no long-term peace plan exists…”, a five-year Niger-Delta Action Plan (PDF) has been unveiled by the Nigerian government, via the Ministry of Niger-Delta Affairs. The plan is to run from 2013 to 2017.
  4. It concludes with this fascinating warning: “The road ahead is far too busy for doomsday forecasts, and Nigeria tends to embarrass those who predict its imminent unraveling.” (p.13).